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THE TENSION BETWEEN TESTAMENTARY
FREEDOM AND PARENTAL SUPPORT
OBLIGATIONS: A COMPARISON
BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN
INTRODUCTION
The tension between freedom of testation and the support obliga-
tions associated with parenthood and marriage creates many policy
and drafting problems for legislatures. The imposition of support obli-
gations on a testator's estate necessarily restricts testamentary free-
dom. Conversely, complete freedom of testation may frustrate the
enforcement of familial support obligations. Although the policies of
freedom of testation and enforcement of support obligations are not
mutually exclusive, it is difficult to satisfy both policies within a single
statutory scheme.
The English family maintenance system' resolves this tension
with a balancing test. Under the English system, if a dependent is left
without adequate support, a court may order an estate to make appro-
priate payment to continue to satisfy the support obligations that the
decedent assumed during his life.2 Testamentary freedom will not be
disturbed, however, if the applicant either did not receive financial
support during the testator's lifetime or is capable of self-support.
The English balancing test has not been adopted in any jurisdic-
tion in the United States. In fact, in the United States there are no
direct remedial procedures to impose support obligations on the estate
of the provider.3 Instead, current state laws favor freedom of testation
at the expense of a dependent's support expectations. This complete
testamentary freedom forces dependents and courts to rely upon indi-
rect methods of imposing support obligations on an estate. Because
these procedures do not have support as their primary objective, they
do not consistently fulfill a dependent's justified expectations of
1. Family maintenance statutes are also found in other Commonwealth legal systems.
These statutes use judicial balancing to resolve the tension between the policies of freedom
of testation and enforcement of support obligations. "[U]nder this system complete testa-
mentary freedom exists, but the courts are given power to reform the will of a testator to
the extent of making reasonable provision for his dependants." E.L.G. TYLER, FAMILY
PROVISION 3 (1977).
2. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. For the sake of brevity and clarity in
this Note, gender-specific pronouns are used to include both genders.
3. See infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.
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support.4
The disinheritance of dependent children is a problem in the
United States. Compiling statistics that reflect the magnitude of the
problem accurately, however, is difficult precisely because there is no
remedy in most jurisdictions. Because lawyers cannot bring the cases
to court, most problem cases pass without comment or remedy.5
Family maintenance legislation for jurisdictions in the United
States is the most appropriate solution to the problems caused by com-
plete deference to testamentary freedom. The primary goal of family
maintenance is the enforcement of support obligations. Family main-
tenance statutes permit courts to examine support obligations and pro-
vide guidelines that force courts to balance support obligations and
freedom of testation equitably. A comparison of (1) the principles of
the English family maintenance system and its practical success with
(2) the principles supporting current state laws in the United States
and their ad hoc procedures establishes that family maintenance legis-
lation is the superior system and should be adopted by state
legislatures.
I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. ENGLISH BACKGROUND
1. Before Family Maintenance Legislation
England has experienced a broad spectrum of succession schemes
since the time of the Norman conquests in 1066. Restraints on free-
dom of testation have existed at various times in English history. In
medieval England, for example, a testator could not dispose of his land
or personal property at his discretion, but instead had to comply with
certain transfer restrictions. 6 By the sixteenth century, the force of
4. See infra notes 135-53 and accompanying text.
5. Dependents rarely take action against wills that make inadequate provision for
them, because they lack remedies. The situation in England before statutory reform was
similar: "Unfortunately, because of the circumstances, very frequently these matters are
never brought before the public. There is no remedy and people hesitate to bring personal
domestic matters, cases of hardship and of bad treatment, before the public." 71 PARL.
DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 39 (1928). Some experts contend that the dearth of recorded cases
itself indicates the need for reform. New York Surrogate Midonick is a particularly active
reformist. See, eg., Midonick & Bush, The Surrogate's Court as a Family Protector,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 4, 1971, at 1, col. 4; Foster, Freed & Midonick, Child Support: The Quick
and the Dead, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1157 (1975). See infra notes 154-71 and accompany-
ing text.
6. The extent of freedom of testation immediately following the Norman conquests is
difficult to discern. Glanvil, writing during the late twelfth century, see 2 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 188 (4th ed. 1936), refers to the legitimacy of any
reasonable alienation of property, but then observes that a man must not disinherit his son
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these restraints diminished significantly; a testator could effectively
disinherit his children. 7  The progression away from restraints8
culminated in total freedom of testation from 1891 through 1938.
2. The 1938 Family Maintenance Legislation
Debate concerning the need to restore restraints on freedom of
testation emerged in Parliament in 1908. 9 The debate remained
and heir. T. PLUNKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 526 (1956). By
the twelfth century, land passed by primogeniture, the succession of the eldest son to the
military fief. The heir inherited only the land that was in the patriarch's possession at
death, so the fief was bound to honor all of the patriarch's inter vivos gifts that encumbered
the land. Id. at 527-28; 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 73 (5th ed.
1942). Primogeniture was extended to all land held in free tenure during the fourteenth
century. Id. at 173. Dower rights entitled the widow "to the use for her life of one-third of
all land of which her husband was seised at any time during the marriage of an estate in fee
simple or fee tail, descendible to children of the marriage. . . . [T]he surviving husband
was entitled by the curtesy to an estate for life in all of his wife's land." Fratcher, Protec-
tion of the Family Against Disinheritance in American Law, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 293,
294-95 (1965). For more detail, see 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 185-94.
The decedent's personal property passed in shares set by consanguinity ("set shares"),
according to the custom of the locality. Generally, if the deceased was survived by a wife
and children, the chattels were divided into three portions: one for the wife, one for the
children, and one to be distributed according to the deceased's wishes. If only a wife or
child survived, the estate was divided into two portions, one for the survivors, and one for
distribution. Id. at 550. An heir of the fief through primogeniture could share in the
surviving children's portion of the personal property only if he permitted the patriarch's
other children to benefit from the land. Dainow, Limitations on Testamentary Freedom in
England, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 337, 341 (1940).
7. Freedom of testation existed in scattered localities throughout England by the four-
teenth century, largely due to the disparate influences of the ecclesiastic and secular laws. 3
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 6, at 553-54. The Wills Act of 1540 permitted any landowner to
devise a large portion of land at his discretion. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAW 364-65 (1st ed. 1926). At that time, shares for personal property distribution
were falling into disuse. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 6, at 556. The obsolescence of set
shares combined with the unrestrained: freedom to pass land by will left children with no
legal claim to any inheritance. Dower and crtesy still protected a surviving spouse's inter-
est in the land.
8. The few remaining restraints on freedom of testation were eliminated during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The last vestiges of the set share system disappeared
from England in 1724, when Parliament abolished the "Custom of London"; London was
the last region to retain such restraints. Abolition was necessary, because the city was
losing revenue as the result of an exodus of citizens who maintained businesses there but
lived elsewhere to avoid the restraints. Some other statutory shares remained on the books
until 1850, but had not been enforced since 1724. See Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance,
85 U. PA. L. REv. 139, 139-40 (1936); Dainow, supra note 6, at 342.
The Dower Act of 1833 sanctioned the frustration of dower and curtesy rights through
inter vivos transfers. Such conveyances had been ineffective against the spousal rights. 3
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 6, at 197. The Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1891, 54 &
55 Viet. ch. 73, § 5, removed the limitations on devises for charitable purposes and on gifts
in mortmain. See E.L.G. TYLER, supra note 1, at 5; J. Ross MARTYN, THE MODERN LAW
OF FAMILY PROVISION 2 (1978). Mortmain (literally, "dead hand") is the practice of con-
veying land to a legal entity, such as a church or charitable corporation. Mortmain termi-
nates any benefit that the lord or government may expect from the land or its bequeathal.
See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *268-69 & n. 2.
9. See 194 PARL. DEB. H.C. (4th ser.) 10 (1908).
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largely dormant, however, until Viscount Astor revived it in the
House of Lords in 1928.10 Astor described in vivid detail the grue-
some situations that arose under a system that permitted decedents to
leave their dependents penniless. Astor considered such cases
"entirely inconsistent with and contrary to the broad sense of fairness
and fair play associated with this country."11 He outlined the histori-
cal justifications for testamentary restrictions and discussed the vari-
ous testamentary schemes used in other Commonwealth countries,
particularly New Zealand.12 Astor advocated the formation of a com-
mittee to examine the family maintenance provisions of the Common-
wealth dominions with a view toward reformation of the English
system. 13 Astor withdrew his request after much criticism, but his
comments on the family maintenance issue triggered yearly debates on
the topic.
Parliamentary debates on family maintenance revolved around
several critical issues. 14 Proponents of reform stressed the injustices of
the system by describing cases of severe hardship created by absolute
freedom of testation.15 They noted that the restraints on the alienation
of property that marital and parental obligations imposed on the living
inexplicably did not apply to a decedent's estate. 16 This distinction
between the support obligations of the living and those of the dead
frequently yielded harsh and inconsistent results, which, it was argued,
indicated that absolute freedom of testation was "bad law."' 17
The members who opposed reform maintained that a law passed
10. See 71 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 37 (1928).
11. Id. at 41.
12. New Zealand's family maintenance legislation dated from 1895. Astor praised that
legislation as a model; it provided "support as it was the moral duty of the testator to
provide." Id. at 42. He drew from "public opinion to be found in the discussions on the
revision of the Prayer Book" to illustrate recognition of the same moral duty in England.
Id. at 41.
13. Astor highlighted the systems of New Zealand, Scotland, Australia, and Canada,
which had statutes to protect dependents. Most were based on the family maintenance
scheme, but Scotland's was a statutory share system. Id. at 42-44.
14. The issues raised in the English debates are relevant to a discussion of family main-
tenance proposals for the United States. See generally 328 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1291
(1937); 317 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 391 (1936); 310 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 45
(1936); 287 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1041 (1934); 283 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 404
(1933); 248 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1641 (1931); 244 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 343
(1930).
15. See 328 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 1291-94 (statement of Mr. Holmes); 71 PARL.
DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 38-42 (statement of Vis. Astor).
16. See 71 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 41 (statement of Vis. Astor). The Poor Laws
permitted guardians to bring actions for support against negligent spouses. Id.
17. I have quoted only a limited number of cases that have been brought to my
attention, . . . but I claim that they show that real hardship and injustice occur
under the law as it stands and, . . . I suggest to your Lordships that they are
sufficiently frequent to justify us taking some action to put things right.
Id. at 40-41 (statement of Vis. Astor).
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in response to a few "hard cases" would indeed make "bad law." 18
Commentators indicated that certain members of the bench would not
be capable of rearranging dispositions in a proper fashion.19 The pro-
posed reform was complex insofar as it required judges to work
through lengthy statutory guidelines to reach an acceptable decision.
This complexity, opponents claimed, made it too difficult for judges to
interpret the statute properly, and the injustices that would result from
misinterpretations of the law were too great a burden for society to
bear. 20 Those favoring complete freedom of testation also alleged that
the rearrangement of dispositions might discourage thrift and produc-
tivity, because people would no longer be free to dispose of their prop-
erty as they saw fit.21 Finally, they argued that the proposed
legislation would cause excessive and frivolous litigation; any disinher-
ited person could bring suit alleging some benefit due from the dece-
dent's estate, even though the claim had little or no merit.22
A critical review of the debates reveals the continuing change in
the focus of the discussion. Proponents of absolute testamentary free-
dom eventually realized that they simply could not effectively criticize
the position of those favoring family maintenance. 23 Once it was
accepted that some form of remedial legislation was necessary, the
precise contours of the statute became the topic of debate. The major
problem with many of the proposals was that they were too complex
to ensure that judges would apply the standards correctly. 24 Conse-
quently, each successive proposal was simplified in an effort to provide
for the maintenance of dependents while also establishing clearly dis-
cernible guidelines for judges. Finally, in its 1937-38 session, 25 Parlia-
18. See id. at 54; see also 328 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1311 (statement of Mr.
Spens).
19. A proposed alternative to family maintenance reform that avoided judicial discre-
tion was the fixed statutory share system1 following the Scottish pattern. Parliament
rejected this proposal, because it was too rigid to satisfy the support policy. See Dainow,
supra note 6, at 346-48.
20. One member criticized leaving the decision to judges:
[B]ut when the State intervenes in the matters of wills I have seen too much of
what goes on in the Courts to think that the Judges are able to do it wisely.
Power was given to the Courts to make a new will, a juster will and a better will.
This is a procedure which I, for my part, very much deprecate being thrust on the
judges, simply because they cannot know and they are very apt to do injustice.
71 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 47-48 (statement of Vis. Haldane).
21. Id. at 55.
22. See 328 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1300 (statement of Lt. Col. Heneage). This
criticism is known as the floodgates argument. For the reformists' response, see infra note
197 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 25.
24. See 328 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1302 (statement of Maj. Dower).
25. The 1937-38 session of Parliament saw many emotional speeches on marital and
parental obligations. One speech, by Eleanor Rathbone, a long-time proponent of family
maintenance legislation in the House of Commons, was particularly moving:
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ment enacted the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1938 ("the 1938
Act").26
The 1938 Act resembles the New Zealand family maintenance
system in that both systems use judicial discretion to limit testamen-
tary freedom and to ensure support for dependents. 27 Under the 1938
Act, a court could only accept applications from disabled children,
minor sons, unmarried daughters, and spouses.28 Parliament extended
the protective scope of the Act in 1952 to include intestate distribu-
tion29 and again in 1958 to include former spouses.30 A 1966 amend-
ment granted courts additional flexibility when distributing an estate
by giving them greater power over property. 31 In 1969, Parliament
amended the Act to include illegitimate children. 32
3. The 1975 Family Maintenance Legislation
In 1971, the Law Commission evaluated the amended 1938 Act
as part of its general review of Britain's family property law.33 The
Commission concluded that the "relief available to the spouse and
children of a deceased person compares unfavorably with the relief
available to a spouse and children after a decree of divorce, nullity or
Is it or is it not right that in this country, alone of all the countries of the civilised
world, it should be possible for a man or woman to enter into a life-long partner-
ship, take the responsibility of bringing children into the world and be compelled
...to provide for husband or wife,. . unless there is some valid reason for open
separation-and then by the accident of death to shuffle it all off-when a woman
has passed the period when she can possibly return to the labour market, when she
has abandoned the use of a profitable profession or business in order to undertake
the duties of wife or mother, to throw her absolutely on the world, upon the rates
very likely, or, far worse, to compel her to bear the cruellest kind of poverty which
faces those who are too proud to seek charity, to compel her to hide in solitude and
suffering, and to endure the harsh verdict of the world which she cannot in any
way repudiate-is that just or right?
Id at 1310.
26. The Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 45 [hereinafter
cited as the 1938 Act].
27. Id. at § 1. "[I]f the court on application. . . is of opinion that the will does not
make reasonable provision. . . , the court may order that such reasonable proyision as the
court thinks fit shall. . . be made."
28. Id. The Act was a product of English society in the 1930s, as reflected by the
criteria that made a dependent eligible to apply for support. The statute made a strong
distinction between the support capabilities of the sexes and recognized no obligations
beyond the family circle, for example, to dependent third persons. See infra notes 120-23
and accompanying text.
29. Intestate's Estate Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, ch. 64, § 7, sched. 3.
30. Matrimonial Causes (Property and Maintenance) Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 35,
§§ 3,4.
31. Family Provision Act, 1966, ch. 35, § 2(2). See E.L.G. TYLER, supra note 1, at 8-9.
32. Family Law Reform Act, 1969, ch. 46, § 18. See E.L.G. TYLER, supra note 1, at 9.
33. THE LAW COMMISSION, FAMILY LAW: FAMILY PROPERTY LAW, PUBLISHED
WORKING PAPER No. 42, at 158 (Oct. 26, 1971), reprinted in 5 THE LAW COMMISSION,
THE LAW COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS 187, 356 (coll. ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
LAW COMM'N WORKING PAPER No. 42].
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judicial separation."'34 It advocated increasing the discretionary power
of courts in family maintenance cases to a level equal to the level of
courts' power in divorce cases. Such discretion would permit courts to
assess more accurately the support obligations and needs of the par-
ties. 35 To this end, the Commission suggested that the courts be given
greater discretion to transfer and settle an estate in a manner more
favorable to the decedent's dependents.36
The Commission recognized, however, the different objectives of
these two types of property division cases. Divorce cases must divide
property equitably between the provider and his dependents, but in
family maintenance cases no support by the decedent is required.
Therefore, the Commission distinguished the aims of support arrange-
ments in divorce cases from the support goals in family maintenance
cases. It defined the purpose of family maintenance legislation as pro-
viding support for the dependent, in contrast to the objective in
divorce cases to share property equitably between spouses. 37 Accord-
ingly, it proposed making the support function clearer in new family
maintenance legislation, 38 emphasizing that the purpose of the legisla-
tion is not to judge a decedent's disposition on its reasonableness. 39
The Commission also suggested that a new statute incorporate a
balancing test devised by courts under earlier statutes.4° The Commis-
sion enumerated the factors that a court should balance, including
(1) the size of the estate; (2) the nature of the relationship between the
applicant and the decedent, including any contribution the applicant
may have made to the estate; and (3) the age and abilities of the
parties. 4 1
34. LAW COMM'N WORKING PAPER No. 42, supra note 33, at 161, reprinted in 5 LAW
COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS at 359.
35. For comparison, the Commission referred to the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1955,
and the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1970. These divorce statutes enforce
maintenance obligations arising from marriage and parenthood and give courts significant
powers to divide marital property. Id.
36. Id. at 175-77, reprinted in 5 LAW COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS at 373-75.
37. Id. at 161, reprinted in 5 LAW COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS at 359.
38. The Commission considered the possibility of extending the family provision legis-
lation to ensure the dependents equitable rights in the property in the estate separate from
support rights. Id. at 159-61, reprinted in 5 LAw COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS at 357-
59. It concluded, however, that the legislation should not be extended in this manner. Id.
at 161, reprinted in 5 LAW COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS at 359.
39. Id. at 163-64, reprinted in 5 LAWv COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS at 361-62. This
point ensures that the distinction between "provision" and "share" is incorporated into the
statute. The aim of such legislation is to provide support for a dependent, not to guarantee
the dependent a "fair" share of the property. If a "fair" share is not needed for support, a
disposition that does not include such a share will stand even if the disposition is
unreasonable.
40. Id. at 168, reprinted in 5 LAW COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS at 366.
41. The new guidelines include:
(1) The size and nature of the estate[.]
(2) The age of the surviving or former spouse and the duration of the marriage[.]
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The changes proposed in the family maintenance area paralleled
contemporaneous changes in the divorce laws. 42 The divorce law, for
example, made no distinction between provision for sons and provision
for daughters, unlike the 1938 Act. The divorce statute also provided
support for people who had been treated like a "child of the family,"
again, unlike the 1938 Act. The Commission suggested omitting an
age limit for child applicants, or, alternatively, changing the age limit
to eighteen, the limit under the divorce laws. 43 Additionally, the
divorce statute provided for payment of educational or vocational
training expenses.44 The Commission advocated amending the child
maintenance provisions of the 1938 Act by adopting a version of these
additions to the English divorce law.
In 1974, the Commission incorporated its findings into an official
recommendation and attached to it a draft statute.45 The Commission
recommended that provisions for spouses should include any equitable
rights that the spouse may have in the estate,46 but it stated that other
dependents should receive payments only to the extent necessary for
maintenance. The Inheritance (Provision for Family Maintenance
and Dependants) Act, 1975 ("the 1975 Act")47 was based on these
findings. The 1975 Act included both the family maintenance theory
and the specific statutory changes the Law Commission
recommended.
The 1975 Act permits judicial alteration of testamentary plans in
cases that involve the disinheritance of or inadequate provision for a
decedent's dependents. Under the 1975 Act, a surviving dependent
must apply to a court for an order to rearrange the original testamen-
tary disposition to provide him with "reasonable financial provi-
(3) Any physical or mental disability of the surviving or former spouse[.]
(4) The contributions made by the surviving or former spouse to the welfare of
the family, including any contribution made by looking after the home or
caring for the family.
(5) The conduct of the surviving spouse or former spouse in relation to the
deceased and otherwise.
Id at 168-69, reprinted in 5 LAW COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS at 366-67 (emphasis and
footnotes omitted).
42. See id at 180-81, 186-87, reprinted in 5 LAW COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS at
378-79, 384-85.
43. The maximum age under the 1938 Act, as amended, was twenty-one. The Inheri-
tance (Family Provision) Act § 1(2)(c).
44. LAW COMM'N WORKING PAPER No. 42, supra note 33 at 185-86, reprinted in 5
LAW COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS at 383-84.
45. THE GREAT BRITAIN LAW COMMISSION, FAMILY LAW: SECOND REPORT ON
FAMILY PROPERTY: FAMILY PROVISION ON DEATH, LAW COMM'N No. 61 (July 31,
1974) [hereinafter cited as LAW COMM'N No. 61].
46. Id at 5. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
47. Inheritance (Provisions for Family Maintenance and Dependants) Act, 1975, ch.
63 [hereinafter cited as the 1975 Act]. The Act went into effect on April 1, 1976.
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sion. ' '48 The 1975 Act allows applications from spouses, former
spouses, children of any age, and others who depended upon the
deceased when he was alive.49 A court order may provide dependents
with periodic payments, a lump sum payment, or a transfer of prop-
erty to remedy the deficient testamentary plan.50 In making its order,
the court must consider the statutory guidelines. These guidelines
direct the court to balance the financial need and resource potential of
the applicants and the current beneficiaries, and to consider the size of
the estate and the deceased's obligations to the applicant. 5' In cases
48. Id. at § 1(2)(a), (b). Section I of the 1975 Act has a dual definition of "provision":
(2) In this Act "reasonable financial provision"-
(a) in the case of an application made by virtue of subsection (I)(a) above by
the husband or wife of the deceased (except where the marriage with the
deceased was the subject of a decree of judicial separation and at the
date of death the decree was in force and the separation was continuing),
means such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the cir-
cumstances of the case for a husband or wife to receive, whether or not
that provision is required for his or her maintenance);
(b) in the case of any other application made by virtue of subsection (I)
above, means such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the
circumstances of the case for the applicant to receive for his
maintenance.
49. Id. at § 1(1). Section 1 provides:
L Application forfinancial provision from deceased's estate
(1) Where after the commencement of this Act a person dies domiciled in
England and Wales and is survived by any of the following persons-
(a) the wife or husband of the deceased;
(b) a former wife or former husband of the deceased who has not
remarried;
(c) a child of the deceased;
(d) any person (not being a child of the deceased) who, in the case of
any marriage to which the deceased was at any time a party, was
treated by the deceased as a child of the family in relation to that
marriage;
(e) any person (not being a person included in the foregoing paragraphs
of this subsection) who immediately before the death of the deceased
was being maintained, either wholly or partly, by the deceased;
that person may apply to the court for an order under section 2 of
this Act on the ground that the disposition of the deceased's estate
effected by his will or the law relating to intestacy, or the combina-
tion of his will and that law, is not such as to make reasonable finan-
cial provision for the applicant.
50. Id. at § 2.
51. Id. at § (3)(1). This section gives courts the following guidelines:
(a) the financial resources and financial needs which the applicant has or is likely
to have in the foreseeable future;
(b) the financial resources and financial needs which any other applicant for an
order under section 2 of this Act has or is likely to have in the foreseeable
future;
(c) the financial resources and financial needs which any beneficiary of the estate
of the deceased has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
(d) any obligations and responsibilities which the deceased had towards any
applicant for an order under the said section 2 or towards any beneficiary of
the estate of the deceased;
(e) the size and nature of the net estate of the deceased;
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involving an application from a spouse, the court must examine the
nature of the marriage and the extent of the applicant's contribution to
the family welfare and assets. Support provisions for children, on the
other hand, may include the cost of the education or training that the
deceased might have provided had he lived.52 These statutory guide-
lines are similar to the standards that courts had devised and used
successfully under previous, less explicit family maintenance
legislation.5 3
B. AMERICAN BACKGROUND
There are few formal legal limitations on freedom of testation in
the United States.54 Moreover, pride in the preservation of testamen-
tary freedom permeates judicial commentary on this area of the law.55
The absence of concrete limitations is somewhat anomalous in the
Anglo-American legal system.56 In the late eighteenth century, Eng-
(f) any physical or mental disability of any applicant for an order under the said
section 2 or any beneficiary of the estate of the deceased;
(g) any other matter, including the conduct of the applicant or any other person,
which in the circumstances of the case the court may consider relevant.
52. Id. at § 3(3). This section sets out guidelines pertaining to children:
Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (g) of subsection (I) above, where
an application for an order under section 2 of this Act is made by virtue of section
I(I)(c) or I(I)(d) of this Act, the court shall, in addition to the matters specifically
mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (f) of that subsection, have regard to the manner in
which the applicant was being or in which he might expect to be educated or
trained, and where the application is made by virtue of section I(I)(d) the court
shall also have regard-
(a) to whether the deceased had assumed any responsibility for the applicant's
maintenance and, if so, to the extent to which and the basis upon which the
deceased assumed that responsibility and to the length of time for which the
deceased discharged that responsibility;
(b) to whether in assuming and discharging that responsibility the deceased did
so knowing that the applicant was not his own child;
(c) to the liability of any other person to maintain the applicant.
53. See J. Ross MARTYN, supra note 8, at 15. See also supra notes 40-41 and accompa-
nying text.
54. Some of these limitations are taxes, the requisite executory formalities for a valid
will, statutory shares, family allowances, pretermission statutes, limitations on charitable
dispositions, and the rule against perpetuities. Community property states generally divide
the ownership of marital property so that each spouse owns a portion; even the most liberal
freedom of testation will not permit a decedent to dispose of property that is not his.
55. See Laube, The Right of a Testator to Pauperize His Helpless Dependents, 13 COR-
NELL L.Q. 559, 559-64 (1928), for a compilation of opinions that illustrate this pride, e.g.,
Ball v. Boston, 153 Wis. 27, 31, 141 N.W. 8, 10 (1913) ("As often, and not too often, said,
the testamentary right is one of the most important of the inherent incidents of human
existence."); In re Moore's Estate, 114 Or. 444, 447, 236 P. 265, 266 (1925) ("It is an
attribute of property that the owner thereof has the right to dispose of it as he pleases.").
56. Most of the countries with a British legal heritage have adopted the family mainte-
nance solution. New Zealand was the first to adopt it. The Testator's Family Maintenance
Act, 1900, N.Z. Stat., 64 Vict. No. 20. For a description of the New Zealand Act, see
Laufer, Flexible Restraint on Testamentary Freedom, 69 HARV. L. REv. 277, 282-84
(1955). Australia and certain Canadian provinces follow the New Zealand model. Id. at
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lish law favored testamentary freedom, and this emphasis was
reflected in the law of the American colonies and ultimately in the law
of the new nation. 57 Although complete testamentary freedom has
yielded to a more equitable and progressive posture in England, the
primacy of the freedom of testation lingers stubbornly in the United
States. Few legal alternatives are available to provide disinherited
dependents with extended maintenance. Nearly all states have home-
stead or family allowances as alternatives for spouses and children. 58
Although in some states these shares are generous, 59 in most they are
quite small 60 or are contingent on conditions that may restrict the
amount the dependent may receive.61 Moreover, these allowances are
designed to support the family only for a limited time.
American laws provide more adequate support for spouses than
for children. Dower and curtesy were the original methods of spousal
protection in the United States, but these measures originally applied
only to land. Many states have either substituted or augmented dower
with the spousal elective share as a means of giving a spouse access to
the marital personal property.62 The spousal share63 ensures the sur-
282-87. Israel adopted a family maintenance scheme in the Israel Succession Act of 1965.
Lipman, Family Disinheritance by a Testator, 108 TRUSTS & ESTATES 965, 1013 (1969).
57. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. The Custom of London was repealed in
1724; by 1776, almost no practical limitations on freedom of testation existed in England.
Even earlier, the land grants for the original colonies were construed to preclude set shares.
See Fratcher, supra note 6, at 295.
58. See WILLS EST. & TR. (P-H) 2734 (1984) (homestead and family allowance stat-
utes by state). A homestead allowance pays a lump sum or gives property to assist in long
term plans, but it generally is not sufficient for subsistence. A family allowance is a pay-
ment designed to support the family for the duration of probate proceedings. For a com-
prehensive description of these allowances, see W. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE
WIDOW'S SHARE 30-31 (1960).
59. See, eg., CAL. PROB. CODE § 640 (West Supp. 1984). The California Code permits
small estates to set aside an allowance of up to $20,000. This provision supplements the
homestead allowance in CAL. PROB. CODE § 660 and the family allowance in CAL. PROB.
CODE § 680.
60. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.1 (McKinney Supp. 1983) gives
up to $1000; W. VA. CODE § 38-8-10 (Michie Supp. 1984) gives up to $1000 as a family
allowance, and § 38-9-5 permits a $5000 homestead allowance; and S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-
41-100 (110) (Law. Co-op. 1976) allows no money at all but permits a meager homestead
allowance.
61. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 196, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981). The provi-
sion is quite small, providing a $100 limit per child for an allowance and permission to stay
in the family house for no more than six months, both at the discretion of the court. Only
if a family establishes a homestead under ch. 188, § 1 may it stay in the home for more than
six months.
62. Haskell, The Power of Disinheritance: Proposal for Reform, 52 GEo. L.J. 499, 503
(1964); W. MACDONALD, supra note 58, at 3. Dower, in its original inchoate form, repre-
sented a troublesome cloud on the title of land. It removed the land from the grasp of the
husband's creditors, Younger, Marital Regimes, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 65 (1981), and the
land holder always bore the risk that a previous owner's wife might assert her dower rights
after her husband had sold the land. W. MACDONALD, supra note 58, at 62-63. Some
states have modified dower by limiting the dower rights to the land in the husband's posses-
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viving spouse a portion of the deceased's property. 64 Although the
spousal share originally may have been designed to provide the surviv-
ing spouse with a source of support,65 recent developments indicate
that the share is viewed increasingly as a means of satisfying the equi-
table rights of the surviving spouse in the marital property.6 6 In view
of this salutary development, it is unfortunate that inter vivos transfers
can subvert spousal share provisions in most jurisdictions.67
Although spouses have a limited array of legal protections from
disinheritance, children have no formal recourse available to them to
procure support from the estate of their parents. 68 For example,
although statutory shares exist for children to establish a right to a
portion of the decedent's estate, the homestead or family allowance
typically accrues to the benefit of the surviving spouse instead of to the
children. 69 Pretermission statutes, the only remedy expressly available
to children in most states, are hopelessly inadequate protective shields,
because they are designed only to redress unintentional omissions.70
Apart from the enforcement of ante mortem court support decrees
sion at the time of death. See Haskell, supra, at 502. This modification made it easy to
evade dower by inter vivos transfer.
63. The spousal share guarantees the surviving spouse a portion of the deceased's
estate. It would be inaccurate to generalize that spousal shares are constructed in one
particular way; they vary from state to state. The options include dispositions that may be
similar to the intestate share, a portion of the intestate share, or realty only. See W. MAC-
DONALD, supra note 58, at 21.
64. Furthermore, the spousal share generally provides the spouse with title to the prop-
erty instead of a life estate, which is all that dower provided. See HASKELL, supra note 62,
at 503.
65. W. MACDONALD, supra note 58, at 24.
66. The Committee on Civil and Political Rights condoned this view: "[D]uring mar-
riage each spouse should have a legally defined and substantial right in the earnings of the
other spouse and in the real and personal property. . . . Such right should survive the
marriage and be legally recognized in the event of its termination by.. . death." Report
to the President's Commission on the Status of Women, quoted in Younger, supra note 62,
at 71. Several states employ the augmented estate concept, which includes certain inter
vivos transfers in the estate for purposes of determining the elective share. It reflects the
partnership concept, that each spouse has rights in property acquired during marriage. Id.
For a list of states that use an augmented estate, see id. at 71 n.202.
67. There are three major views regarding transfers that evade the statutory share
requirement by reducing the basic estate from which the share is calculated. Either statutes
or court decisions dictate which view a jurisdiction adopts. The three views are: (1) the
reality view, which holds that any inter vivos transfer that is not a sham will decrease the
estate; (2) the intent view, which holds that any transfer made for the purpose of reducing
the share will be included in the estate; and (3) the control view, which holds that any
transfer over which the transferor had significant control is included in the estate. For a
brief description of these views, see Haskell, supra note 62, at 504-05; for a detailed discus-
sion, see W. MACDONALD, supra note 58, passim.
68. But see infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text (Louisiana, Oregon, and Wiscon-
sin have some provisions).
69. It is assumed that the parent will support the child; this assumption is often unreal.
istic in light of the current prevalence of divorce. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying
text.
70. For example, the Uniform Probate Code provides:
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against an estate, there is currently no legal procedure through which
a child may request continuation of obligatory parental support.
Three states have procedures that make support available to chil-
dren. Louisiana adheres to a forced share system under its Civil
Code.71 Under the forced share or legitime system, children can only
be disinherited in specific situations.72 Although the child's share is
calculated from an augmented estate,73 certain assets are not included
in this calculation.74 Thus, a testator who is intent upon disinheriting
his children can easily evade the Code's support provisions.
Wisconsin also restricts a testator's freedom to disinherit a child.
Wisconsin law is a combination of the statutory share and family
maintenance systems.75 A court may order an estate to provide an
allowance for a dependent child. Courts calculate the award by con-
sidering support and potential education expenses, but only until the
child is eighteen years old. The allowance will not apply if the testator
provided adequately for the child in his will.76 Wisconsin's statute
(a) If a testator fails to provide in his will for any of his children born or
adopted after the execution of his will, the omitted child receives a share in the
estate equal in value to that which he would have received if the testator had died
intestate unless:
(1) it appears from the will that the omission was intentional;
(2) when the will was executed the testator had one or more children and
devised substantially all his estate to the other parent of the omitted child;
or
(3) the testator provided for the child by transfer outside of the will and the
intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by
statements of the testator or from the amount of the transfer on other evi-
dence.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-302, 8 U.L.A. 90 (1984) (adopted in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico,
North Dakota, and Utah).
71. See generally Nathan, An Assault on the Citadel. A Rejection of Forced Heirship,
52 TUL. L. REv. 5 (1977); Lemann, In Defense of Forced Heirship, 52 TUL. L. REv. 20
(1977); LeVan, Alternatives to Forced Heirship, 52 TUL. L. REv. 29 (1977). Forced heir-
ship is frequently called "the legitime system." Louisiana is the only state that has this
system, which derived from the Roman and French Civil Codes. See Lemann, supra, at 20-
21.
72. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. §§ 1493, 1495 (West Supp. 1984). But see LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. § 1621 (West 1952) (listing 10 just causes for which parents may disinherit their
children).
73. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. § 1505 (West Supp. 1982).
74. Nathan, supra note 71 at 12. Additionally, the share given to the child is set
according to the number of surviving children, LA. CIv. CODE ANN. § 1493, but the stat-
ute does not address the needs of the child and adequacy of the share to meet those needs.
Nathan, supra note 71.
75. See Summary, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 861 (West 1971).
76. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 861.35 (West Supp. 1983). The statute provides:
(1) If decedent is survived by minor children, the court may order an allow-
ance for the support and education of such minor child until he reaches a specified
age, not to exceed 18. This allowance may be made whether the estate is testate or
intestate: but no allowance may be made if the decedent has amply provided for
each child by the terms of his will and if the estate is sufficient to carry out the
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bears a closer resemblance to family maintenance legislation than does
any other state's statutes. 77
Oregon's probate code permits "necessary and reasonable provi-
sion from the estate of a decedent for the support of the spouse and
dependent children of the decedent."' 78 The statute provides courts
with vague guidelines for determining the amount of support needed.
Moreover, the statute defines "support" broadly to include transfers of
real or personal property or periodic payments. 79 Commentators
hoped that the statute would be a means of providing permanent sup-
port for dependents,80 but a study has determined that courts usually
grant only temporary support under the statute.8 ' This conservative
approach may be the result of statutory vagueness or of imprecise
drafting;82 both of these factors would make judges reluctant to apply
terms after payment of all debts and expenses; or if support and education have
been provided for by any other means, or if the surviving spouse is legally responsi-
ble for support and education and has ample means to provide them in addition to
his own support. In any case where the decedent is not survived by a spouse, the
court also may allot directly to the minor children household furniture, furnishings
and appliances.
77. Attempts in New York to pass family maintenance legislation have not succeeded.
See infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
78. OR. REv. STAT. § 114.015 (1983).
79. OR. REV. STAT. § 114.055 (1983) provides:
Nature of Support
(1) Provision for support under ORS 114.015 ordered by the court may consist of
any one or more of the following:
(a) Transfer of title to personal property.
(b) Transfer of title to real property.
(c) Periodic payment of moneys during administration of the estate, but the
payments may not continue for more than two years after the date of
death of the decedent.
(d) The court, in determining provision for support shall take into consider-
ation the solvency of the estate, property available for support other
than property of the estate, and property of the estate inherited by or
devised to the spouse and children.
80. See Note, Protection of the Surviving Spouse: The Demise of Dower and Curtesy
and the New Oregon Probate Code, 6 WILLAMErrE L.J. 449, 461-62 (1970).
81. The study was conducted in Multnomah County, Oregon during the summer of
1976. Note, Protection of the Surviving Spouse Under the Oregon Probate Law, 57 OR. L.
REV. 135 (1977). In 1728 estates administered, there were 23 applications for temporary
support, id. at 140, and three applications for transfers of property or payment under
§ 114.055, id. at 145. The statute itself specifically favors temporary support. OR, REV.
STAT. § 114.035 (1983).
82. If the statute was meant to provide permanent support, this provision should have
been explicit. The law gives no guidance for how long necessary and reasonable provision
should continue. Moreover, even if the bulk of the statute is read as a means of providing
permanent support, the periodic payments in § 114.055 are limited to two years. This
inconsistency may have made courts reluctant to read the statute broadly. See Note, supra
note 81, at 143. One commentator explained the two-year limitation as an effort to dis-
tribute the assets of the estate in a timely fashion. See Note, supra note 80, at 462 n.85.
Perhaps another reason why courts have construed the statute narrowly is its inadequate
guidelines. The estate of a decedent who had two families from divorce illustrates this
inadequacy. Note, supra note 81, at 146-47. Both families were needy, and both included
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the statutory provisions aggressively.
The statutory schemes of both Louisiana and Oregon provide
support for spouses as well as for children. Louisiana is a community
property state; therefore, the spouse keeps her share of the community
property. The spouse, however, is not a forced heir; dispositions to the
spouse may be restricted if the decedent has surviving children. 83 Ore-
gon's provision for surviving spouses is the same as that for dependent
children and has been similarly unsuccessful.8 4
Recent societal changes increase the magnitude of the problems
created by the disinheritance of a dependent child.8 5 At one time, the
disinheritance of children was an occasional problem encountered in
the dispositions of eccentric testators.8 6 Yet the increase in divorces,
single-parent families, and reconstituted families8 7 is likely to alter dis-
inheritance and support patterns significantly. In divorce negotia-
tions, children are frequently the focus of legal battles88 that may leave
one parent with hostile feelings for the child. If an alienated parent
remarries and has children in a second marriage, he may intentionally
disinherit the children of the first marriage.89
Several other problems are likely to emerge in the wake of
divorce. A decedent who dies with more than one family may not
have an estate that is large enough to support both.90 The family
maintenance solution for this difficult problem may be to require a
judge to balance the needs of the families in view of the limited estate.
Additionally, the decedent's surviving spouse may not be his child's
natural parent. Consequently, the stepparent has no legal obligation
to support the child unless the stepparent has adopted the child. Even
the decedent's minor children, but the assets were not sufficient to support both families.
The statute did not help the court determine the extent of need; thus, the court did not
grant temporary support. The disposition was abandoned, and the estate was distributed
according to the intestacy statute. The court made no analysis of the parties' needs. Id.
83. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. § 916 (West 1952).
84. Note, supra note 81, at 145.
85. For an elaboration of troublesome fact patterns arising from the increase of divorce
and single parenting, see Note, Family Maintenance: An Inheritance Scheme for the Living,
8 RUT.-CAM. L. REV. 672 (1977).
86. Hahlo, The Case for Family Maintenance in Quebec, 16 MCGILL L. REv. 533, 540
(1970).
87. In 1979, 18.5% of minor children in the United States were being raised by single
parents. This is a significant increase, and it is predicted to continue. It is estimated that
by 1990, 15% of minor children will be living in reconstituted families. Younger, supra
note 62, at 86-87.
88. Id. at 88.
89. Foster, Freed & Midonick, supra note 5, at 1182.
90. A related issue is whether the decedent owes support to both families. If the sec-
ond marriage is a brief twilight marriage, perhaps the assets accumulated during the first
marriage should revert back to the first spouse or the children of the original marriage. See
Haskell, Disinheritance Restraints, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 105 (E.
Halback ed. 1977).
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if the surviving parent is the child's parent, the surviving parent may
not be sufficiently responsible to provide support for the child. If there
is no testamentary disposition that makes specific provision for the
child, the surviving spouse's mismanagement may leave the child des-
titute.91 Separate provision from the estate in the form of periodic
payments for the child's benefit would reserve a portion of the estate,
making it available for better management, and would prevent the
estate from being squandered quickly.92
The remedies that the current legal framework affords disinher-
ited dependents are inadequate. A testator may totally disinherit his
children in all but three states,93 and the only guaranteed support for
spouses, statutory shares, is not designed to provide support for chil-
dren. This situation is anomalous in the Anglo-American legal tradi-
tion, and the inequities that it creates warrant reform.
II
POLICY OBJECTIVES
A. ENGLISH POLICY OBJECTIVES
Laws affecting testation must accommodate two competing poli-
cies. One policy is freedom of testation; the other is enforcement of
the support obligations the testator assumed in marriage and
parenthood. If there are no limitations on testamentary freedom, a
testator may disinherit his dependents and ignore his support obliga-
tions. On the other hand, requiring an estate to provide support for a
decedent's dependents restricts testamentary freedom. Neither policy
must totally eclipse the other. This tension can be resolved through a
sufficiently flexible statutory scheme that accommodates both policies
and emphasizes one or the other according to the circumstances of
each case.
The parliamentary debates that preceded the 1938 Act indicate a
sensitivity to the tension between the policies. 94 The family mainte-
91. Cahn, supra note 8, at 143-44; Laufer, supra note 56, at 193. Cahn writes of the
spouse who is totally inexperienced in financial matters. For example, he estimates that
lump sum life insurance payments are spent within seven years. Despite women's increas-
ing sophistication as financial managers, the danger of mismanagement by the surviving
spouse still exists.
92. Laufer, supra note 56, at 293, contends that periodic payments are ideal for mainte-
nance, because the timing of payment safeguards the estate from being squandered quickly
and permits some court control. Social service agencies could assume an active role if the
child were awarded periodic payments. A new agency could be formed or an existing one
extended to assist the child and his guardian to allocate funds in a productive and safe
manner. A court could consider a parent's irresponsibility during the hearings for mainte-
nance, and it could appoint responsible agencies or guardians in appropriate cases.
93. Louisiana, Oregon, and Wisconsin. See supra notes 71-84.
94. See supra notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
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nance legislation in England is a flexible statutory scheme that accom-
modates both policies. English judges must now consider both
objectives and balance them in each case in order to reach an equitable
compromise.
The objective of the 1975 English family maintenance legislation
is "securing reasonable provision for the maintenance of depen-
dents."95  The deceased's maintenance obligation does not include
anything beyond maintenance for dependents other than surviving
spouses. Consequently, family maintenance legislation gives a family
no guarantee that its application for support will be successful. An
applicant will succeed only if he proves that he was dependent upon
the decedent and that the provision in the will is inadequate for main-
tenance. Courts examine other sources of the applicant's income; if
these sources provide sufficient support, the court should not award
payment.9 6 An application under the family maintenance system,
then, does not automatically infringe upon the testator's freedom of
disposition.
The Law Commission's examination of divorce statutes97 to dis-
cern the support obligations of an estate indicates an intent to enforce
a uniform support standard. The level of support should be consis-
tent, whether a child seeks support under divorce law or under the
family maintenance statute.9 8 Guidelines in the 1975 Act are designed
to secure continuity in a dependent's support9 9 through objective
determinations100 of financial need, potential earning capacity, antici-
pated educational or training expenses, and the degree of support that
the decedent provided in life. 10 1
Family maintenance legislation preserves freedom of testation yet
provides for the needs of surviving dependents. It meets both policy
objectives by requiring an analysis of each case through specified
guidelines. If the testamentary disposition is either adequate or justi-
fied in view of the circumstances the court deems relevant,10 2 the court
will respect the testator's freedom of disposition. In sum, family main-
tenance accommodates both policies in an equitable fashion.
95. LAW COMM'N WORKING PAPER No. 42, supra note 33, at 161, reprinted in 5 LAW
COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS at 359.
96. See supra note 51.
97. See supra note 35, text accompanying note 37.
98. LAW COMM'N No. 61, supra note 45, at 5-6.
99. LAW COMM'N WORKING PAPER No. 42, supra note 33, at 185, reprinted in 5 LAW
COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS at 383.
100. The guidelines' objectivity may act as a safeguard against judicial overstepping or
arbitrary use of the statute.
101. See supra note 52.
102. See supra note 51.
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B. AMERICAN POLICY OBJECTIVES
State legislatures must consider the same policies that confront
the English law makers, freedom of testation and enforcement of
parental and marital obligations to support dependents. In the United
States, however, legislatures and courts consider freedom of testation
to be more important than a dependent's support expectations.10 3 As
a New York legislative advisory commission stated, "our tradition of
limited restraint upon the disposition of property by will has become
part of our public policy." 1 4 The preference for testamentary free-
dom has totally eclipsed support obligations.
It is difficult to discern why the right of testamentary disposition
has not been modified more in the United States.105 Several theories
attempt to explain the rationales underlying the vigorous protection of
this right. Some maintain that the freedom to possess and to dispose
of property at will is characteristic of advanced civilizations. 106
Others argue that freedom to dispose of property provides an incentive
for productivity and advancement; restrictions on freedom of testation
threaten to destroy such incentives. 10 7 Elevation of the privilege of
disposition to the status of a fundamental right, however, is legally
inaccurate and is essentially only a product of judicial preference. 108
Marital and parental support obligations are enforceable when
the spouse or parent is alive and when dependents have common law
or statutory remedies to enforce these obligations.109 Moreover, after-
divorce, alimony and support decrees provide a mechanism for enforc-
103. See generally, Laube, supra note 55, at 560-64.
104. NEW YORK STATE, THIRD REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON
THE MODERNIZATION, REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES TO THE
GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 211 (Legis. Doc. No. 19, Mar. 31, 1964) [hereinafter.
cited as THIRD REPORT].
105. "Freedom of alienation has been a favorite of our common law, and this platitude
alone could possibly account for the present state of the law." Haskell, supra note 62, at
500.
106. 1 1. REDFIELD, WILLS 1-3 (1876):
But it [testamentary freedom] is, nevertheless, an instinctive sentiment, intimately
associated with that love of acquisition, and of dominion, which forms the basis
• ..of social progress; and which in its normal development, is the sure measure
of advancing civilization, and, in its morbid excesses, equally marks the process of
declension, and the increase of crime.
107. See Cahn, supra note 8, at 145.
108. The Constitution does not protect "the right to will" as a fundamental right on the
same level, for example, as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, or other constitutionally
enumerated fundamental rights. To the contrary,
[t]he right to take property by devise or descent is a statutory privilege, and not a
natural right. Such matters are strictly within legislative control. . . .It could in
the exercise of sovereignty take any or all property upon the death of the owner for
the payment of the decedent's debts, and apply the residue to public uses.
Laube, supra note 55, at 564 (quoting In re Emerson's Estate, 191 Iowa 900, 905, 183 N.W.
327, 329 (1921)).
109. Foster, Freed & Midonick, supra note 5, at 1158.
[Vol. 17:321
1984] TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM & FAMILY SUPPORT 339
ing support obligations. That is, in the context of divorce proceedings,
obligations to support dependent children take precedence over the
parent's obligations to support a spouse or himself.110 These obliga-
tions of living parents frequently include educational costs, if the child
reasonably may expect them.''
No adequate attempts have been made to ensure that the obliga-
tion to support will continue after the provider dies. The spousal
share, purportedly devised to provide support,' 12 may yield insufficient
funds, or inter vivos transfers may defeat it in many jurisdictions."13
Moreover, no efforts have been made to incorporate child support pol-
icies into black letter law. The rationale behind the failure to provide
for children is reliance upon the surviving spouse to support the
child.114 The presumption that a surviving spouse who has received
property from the estate will care for the child may be misplaced in
situations involving divorce, 115 and mismanagement of funds may
cause additional problems." 6 Finally, leaving the support of the child
to a surviving parent assumes that the parent will do what is best to
support the child, including electing against the will if the statutory
share is larger than the disposition provided in the will." 7 The patch-
work of devices developed in American jurisdictions to provide sup-
port for a dependent makes support the result of good fortune rather
than a right secured by reliable legal procedures. The need for reform
is evident.
110. The "obligation to support dependent children transcends all other obligations
including that of the beneficiary himself to his own food, clothing and shelter." In re Estate
of Chusid, 60 Misc. 2d 462, 465, 301 N.Y.S.2d 766, 771 (Sur. Ct. 1969).
111. See Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 IMI. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978) (parents may
be statutorily obliged to provide funding for a child's college education); Anderson v.
Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (common law right to educational
expenses). See also Foster, Freed & Midonick, supra note 5, at 1162, 1180. But see Sun-
derwirth v. Williams, 553 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (common law right to
educational expenses is subject to the financial capabilities of parent and child); Morris v.
Henry, 193 Va. 631, 70 S.E.2d 417 (1952) (support decree can be enforced against deceased
parent's estate).
112. THIRD REPORT, supra note 104, at 213.
113. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
114. NEW YORK STATE, FOURTH REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION
ON THE MODERNIZATION, REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES TO
THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 1344 (Legis. Doe. No. 19, May 31, 1965) [herein-
after cited as FOURTH REPORT].
115. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
117. Cahn, supra note 8, at 143-44.
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III
THE CASE LAW
A. ENGLISH CASES
1. 1975 Act Cases
The 1975 Act is progressive in two respects. First, the Act's
guidelines 18 provide an objective framework within which a court
must assess and protect the child's interests.1 19 Second, the Act per-
mits courts to take applications not only from dependent minor chil-
dren and spouses but also from dependents who are not family
members and from children who are not minors.
In Malone v. Harrison,'2" for example, a non-family member
applied for support under the 1975 Act. Using the statutory guide-
lines, the court first considered the applicant's financial need and the
adequacy of the will's provisions for the testator's beneficiaries. 12 1 In
order to determine the support that the applicant reasonably should
expect, the court examined her relationship with the testator. It con-
sidered both her independent earning capacity and the extent to which
the testator encouraged her dependence upon him. Satisfied that the
applicant's dependence was created by the testator, the court ruled
118. See supra notes 51-52.
119. The extension of the class of dependents and the resort to additional criteria make
the concept of "provision" under the 1975 Act socially progressive. Parliament has
responded to changes in society and has incorporated these changes into the Act's provi-
sions. Three illustrations of the changes are elimination of sexual discrimination, inclusion
of educational expenses in necessary maintenance, and expansion of the class of applicants
outside family bounds. See supra notes 48-49, 51-52.
120. [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1353. The applicant in Malone was a mistress of twelve years who
had been omitted from her lover's will. Two years before he died, he informed her that he
would not include her in his will, but he also showed her an article that explained the 1975
Act. She was entitled to apply under section l(1)(e). See supra note 49. Because the 1975
Act permits such applications, it has earned the nickname of the "Mistresses' Charter".
But bringing a mistress into the applicant pool and weighing her support needs against
those of a spouse will not always benefit the mistress, because the 1975 Act imposes high
obligations to spouses. Whether a state statute would permit applications from mistresses
is a matter for legislative discussion. Although it does seem sensible to permit some appli-
cations from non-family members, family maintenance legislation need not recognize mere-
tricious relationships per se.
Workers' compensation is an interesting parallel and may provide a starting point for
legislative consideration of support for non-family members. "Usually, actual contribu-
tions to claimant's support is enough to establish dependency without evidence of legal
obligation to support." 2 A. LARSON, WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION § 63.00 (1981). See
id. at § 63.21. States differ in their application of workers' compensation to "illicit relation-
ship claimants." Generally, a claimant who is involhed in a relationship that he or she does
not know is illicit may receive death benefits. See id. at § 63.43. But courts are divided on
the topic of "intentional illicit relationship" claimants. Some courts contend that depen-
dency has no moral implications and grant benefits to such claimants, but others refuse
benefits to paramours. The modem view of granting benefits irrespective of moral consid-
erations seems to be gaining strength. Id. at § 63.43.
121. [1979] 1 W.L.R. at 1362.
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that she was entitled to receive some provision.122 A meticulous eval-
uation of specific factors led the court to a precise award for the appli-
cant.123 The applicant in Malone would not have been entitled to
apply for support under earlier family maintenance legislation. More-
over, the statutory guidelines provided the basis for the court's deter-
mination of an equitable support payment in view of the facts relevant
to the applicant and testator; judicial intuition yielded to a more sys-
tematic analysis of need and entitlement.
In re Coventry' 24 also involved an applicant who would not have
been eligible to apply under the 1938 Act. The applicant, a forty-six-
year-old son of the decedent, was omitted from the intestate distribu-
tion of his father's estate. Father and son had lived together for the
nineteen years preceding the father's death, and during that time the
applicant was not dependent upon his father. The son had performed
numerous administrative duties of the household, had paid some of
the bills, and generally had cared for his elderly father. Low earnings
and support obligations under a divorce decree had placed the son in
financial difficulty. The intestate statute gave the entire estate to the
widow, despite the fact that she and the decedent had been separated
and had lived apart for many years.
The Coventry court applied a two-tier analysis. The court ini-
tially examined whether the distribution of the estate made "reason-
able financial provision for the applicant," then assessed whether the
judge should exercise his discretion to issue financial provision from
the estate.1 25 The court, noting that "the word 'maintenance'. . . is a
word of somewhat limited meaning in its application to any person
qualified to apply, other than a husband or wife,"' 26 held that the fail-
ure to provide a maintenance allowance for the son was reasonable in
view of the relevant factors in the 1975 Act. The court maintained
that the decedent had a stronger obligation to support his wife because
of her contribution to rights in the marital property. Hence, the court
found that it was reasonable for an independent adult son to receive no
provision from the estate and thus would not disturb the intestate
122. Id. at 1364-65.
123. The court considered her lifestyle and her annual living expenses. It made an
accounting of her free capital, the value of her residences, and her yearly earning potential.
Turning to actuarial tables, the court determined the amount that the estate should contrib-
ute to her support in order to maintain her standard of living for her estimated life span.
The amount taken from the estate reduced the bequest to one of the will's beneficiaries who
was wealthy and did not require inheritance for support. The case seems unusual, for the
amount of the estate was sufficient to support all concerned, leaving no one with inadequate
funds. Id. at 1365-66.
124. E1979] 3 W.L.R. 802.
125. Id. at 809.
126. Id. at 807.
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distribution. 127
Applications from dependents who would have been ineligible to
apply for support before the 1975 Act, such as those in Malone and
Coventry, require courts to consider the facts of the particular case
carefully. The Act emphasizes that the deceased's support obligations
must arise from the applicant's dependency rather than from tradi-
tional societal expectations concerning support. The amount of sup-
port required, if any, varies with each case and is determined on the
basis of the Act's objective guidelines. As Malone and Coventry
demonstrate, the guidelines' flexible standards enable courts to
respond to the particular case's support or maintenance issues and to
ensure that the award will be equitable.
2. Divorce Cases
In revising family maintenance legislation in England, the Law
Commission used divorce laws as a model for estate support obliga-
tions. 128 A brief examination of two divorce cases will illustrate the
rationale for creating parallel judicial powers in divorce and disinheri-
tance cases.
In Preston v. Preston,1 29 a wealthy divorced couple litigated the
division of cash and property; both husband and wife had contributed
substantially to the marital assets. The court measured the husband's
support obligations by establishing the reasonable support standards
that the wife and child should expect. 130 A detailed accounting of the
assets and a history of typical spending led the court to affirm a large
lump-sum payment to the wife. In calculating the wife's payment, the
court included reasonable educational expenses for their minor son. 131
The court analogized the award to one given in a case under the 1975
Act. 132
Similarly, in Lilford v. Glynn,133 another divorce case involving a
wealthy couple, the court upheld financial arrangements that provided
127. Id. at 810-12. The distribution may be "reasonable" by family maintenance stan-
dards, but it seems to be an unfair share of the estate in light of the time and care that the
applicant gave to the intestate.
128. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
129. [1981] 3 W.L.R. 619.
130. Among the standards used to discern these obligations were the amount of the
wife's contribution to the marital assets, her needs, and the couple's standard of living. Id.
at 624-26.
131. The court rejected separate periodic payments to the boy in order to facilitate a
"clean break" between the husband and wife. Perhaps this was unwise, because the wife
had total discretion over allocation of the boy's support funds. Separate payments
independent from the wife's management would have met the husband's support obligation
to the boy better.
132. Id. at 638.
133. [1979] 1 W.L.R. 78.
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funds for the reasonable maintenance and education of their minor
daughters. The court, however, rejected a request for overly generous
payments that would have provided the children with cash after they
attained majority, because these payments transcended the father's
legal obligations. The court noted that parental support obligations
cease when the child becomes eighteen; consequently, a parent,
regardless of wealth, cannot be compelled to provide support for adult
children.134
There are clear parallels among the 1975 Act cases and Preston
and Glynn. Support for dependents is and should be required, but
only within reasonable limits. Furthermore, the support provision
must be adequate and should be ascertained on the basis of objective
legal guidelines. The wealth of the obligor or the financial straits of a
non-dependent applicant alone should not define legal obligations.
The same balancing of legal support obligations and freedom to dis-
pose of property exists in many divorce cases and in cases arising
under the 1975 Act. The Law Commission's reliance on divorce law
was well placed, and the cases illustrate that the revisions provide a
workable and uniform standard for the support of dependents.
B. AMERICAN CASES
1. Courts Favor Disinherited Dependents
Common law and statutory constraints direct courts to prefer
freedom of testation over family support obligations when these two
policies conflict. Yet courts frequently comment on the rights of
dependents, especially children, and try to prevent the inequities that
the current law condones. Unfortunately, the common law and statu-
tory preference for freedom of testation prevents judges from basing
decisions on the satisfaction of a decedent's support obligations.
Instead, courts must resort to indirect methods to remedy what they
deem to be an inequitable "testamentary" disposition and to provide
support for a disinherited dependent. Judicial activity in the area pro-
duces ad hoe limitations that restrict testamentary freedom, contrary
to the primacy of this doctrine.
Dispositions that are unnatural, that is, wills that break the tradi-
tional rules of consanguinity or affection, are frequently subject to
careful judicial scrutiny and reformation.1 35 In many cases, for exam-
ple, unnatural dispositions have been particularly susceptible to attack
on the basis of inadequate testamentary capacity or undue influence.13 6
134. Id. at 85.
135. See generally Laube, supra note 55, at 564-69, 572.
136. See, e.g., Hall v. Mikovich, 158 Mont. 430, 492 P.2d 1388 (1972) (charge of undue
influence against the testator's wife reached jury).
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Such an allegation places the burden of proving the validity of the will
on the beneficiaries. When these cases go to a jury, the jury frequently
is sympathetic to a disinherited dependent.1 37
Some states have well-developed case law in this area. For exam-
ple, Kentucky has an interesting line of cases concerning "unnatural
wills." In McDonald's Executors v. McDonald,138 decided in 1905, the
court set aside an unnatural disposition by defining testamentary
capacity in terms of an ability to recognize the objects of one's bounty
and the duty owed them. The testator's disposition only provided his
family with a life estate in his property, but the court observed that a
fee simple would have made living easier for the dependents and thus
was a preferred disposition. To ensure that the family obtained the
"appropriate" possessory interest, the court ruled that the evidence
presented, including the device of the life estate, indicated that the
testator lacked the requisite perception of his duty to the objects of his
bounty. The court's manipulation of the definition of testamentary
capacity allowed it to reach a result congruent with its view of an
appropriate testamentary diposition.
In later decisions,139 Kentucky courts expanded the applicability
of the "objects of the testator's bounty" rule and thereby permitted
will contests to reach juries in order to resolve questions of mental
incapacity and undue influence. "[W]here a will is unnatural in its
provisions such a fact, when unexplained and when corroborated by
even slight evidence, is sufficient to take to the jury the question of
undue influence." 14 The unnatural will alone is not enough to prove
undue influence or lack of capacity,1 41 but the burden of production is
slight. Kentucky does not require those challenging unnatural wills to
produce direct proof of mental incapacity or undue influence.142
Moreover, the presentation of contrary evidence by the proponents of
a testamentary scheme will not prevent these issues from going to the
jury. 143
Although pretermission statutes are designed to provide a remedy
137. See, eg., Laube, supra note 55, at 572-75.
138. 120 Ky. 211, 85 S.W. 1084 (1905).
139. E.g., McKinney v. Montgomery, 248 S.W.2d 719 (Ky. 1952) (when a testator is on
affectionate terms with his children and disinherits them, there is sufficient evidence to
submit the question of lack of testamentary capacity to a jury).
140. Id. at 721.
141. Sutton v. Combs, 419 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Ky. 1967) (jury's verdict of undue influ-
ence reasonable in light of evidence despite proponent's assertion that evidence did not
prove undue influence). The court also noted the pertinence of the testator's capacity to
recognize the natural objects of his bounty. Id. at 776.
142. Zeiss v. Evans, 436 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1969) (when a will is unnatural in provisions,
it is easy to prove undue influence; case went to jury when the will disinherited testator's
children in favor of a nephew). See also Belcher v. Somerville, 413 S.W.2d 620 (Ky. 1967).
143. Sutton v. Combs, 419 S.W.2d at 779.
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for children whom the testator omitted from a will unintentionally,144
courts also have used the statutes to provide an inheritance share for
children whom the testator may have omitted intentionally. The stat-
utes frequently establish a rebuttable presumption that the testator for-
got the child, which places a high burden of proof on the proponents
of the will.1 45 Arkansas courts, for example, construe the state statute
in favor of the omitted child. "It will be presumed that the omission
was unintentional, no contrary intent appearing in the will itself. '1 46
Moreover, extrinsic evidence is generally not admissible, because the
statute is construed to operate in favor of the child. "The intention of
the testator is to be gathered from the four corners of the instrument
itself."1 47 Finally, if extrinsic evidence is admissible in some jurisdic-
tions, it will be admitted only to show lack of intent to disinherit.1 48
Courts also use life insurance contracts as a means of ensuring
support for children, especially in cases that involve a divorced parent.
Courts recognize that there is no equivalent to the spousal share for
the child, and they frequently prefer children's claims over those of a
spouse in litigation involving an insurance policy.149 Litigation often
occurs between a spouse and a child from a previous marriage. In
order to prevent disinheritance following a divorce, courts sometimes
require a divorced parent to keep life insurance policies that name his
children as beneficiaries. 150 If the parent breaches the agreement to
keep his children as beneficiaries, however, the child's remedy depends
144. See supra note 70.
145. Mathews, Trends in the Power to Disinherit Children, 16 A.B.A. J. 293 (1930).
146. Robinson v. Mays, 271 Ark. 818, 821, 610 S.W.2d 885, 887 (1981) (two children
held to be pretermitted heirs).
147. Armstrong v. Butler, 262 Ark. 31, 39, 553 S.W.2d 453, 457 (1977) (despite an
earlier holographic will, children were pretermitted heirs).
148. See In re Leonetti, 115 Cal. App. 3d 378, 171 Cal. Rptr. 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
(may show lack of intent to disinherit by looking in will and outside will); Estate of Fal-
cone, 211 Cal. App. 2d 40, 27 Cal. Rptr. 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (a letter explaining will
may show lack of intent to disinherit).
149. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Markel, 90 Wis. 2d 126, 279 N.W.2d 715 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1979), involved an insured decedent who deliberately had named his daughter as
beneficiary. The court rejected the widow's claim against the policy and commented that
insurance policies are an important source of protection for children. Spouses may take
statutory shares, but children have no such recourse and rely more heavily on the policies.
150. Riley v. Riley, 131 So. 2d 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961), required a husband in a
divorce settlement to keep all insurance policies that he owned for the benefit of his chil-
dren. The court commented on the law of the state:
Although the law will permit a general creditor to enforce payment of a continuing
obligation against the estate of a deceased father, it does not afford the same pro-
tection to a helpless child. In the event of the father's death, the rule of law pres-
ently in effect in this state places the burden of supporting and maintaining the
minor children of a deceased father on someone not obligated to bear it, or on the
public, in the event the father leaves no estate or disinherits the children by will.
Although this rule may well comport with the law of the jungle, its proper place in
a modem civilized society is subject to question.
Id. at 492.
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upon the court's sympathy and ingenuity.151
As another means of protecting children, a majority of state
courts enforce existing support decrees, if no statute bars such
action 152 Enforcement of support obligations against an estate is
appropriate, because "[t]he decree of a court requiring the father to
provide for the wants of his children would be a futile thing if it could
be defeated by a will leaving all of his property to somebody else." 15 3
2. Development of New York Case Law
A review of the New York case law reveals a recurrent effort to
lessen the tension between family support obligations and testamen-
tary freedom. A plan for a reform of the law concerning the disinheri-
tance of children emerged in a line of Surrogate Court opinions. 154
The relevant line of cases involves a recently repealed state statute that
permitted a decedent's spouse or issue to challenge charitable disposi-
tions that total more than one-half of the estate.' 55 The decedent's
spouse or issue could bring such an action only if he or she would
151. Two recent Oregon cases addressed the problem of a deceased parent who breached
an agreement to maintain insurance policies for the benefit of the children from a former
marriage. In Sinsel v. Sinsel, 7 Or. App. 153, 614 P.2d 115 (1980), the decedent substituted
his second wife for his minor daughter as beneficiary. The court imposed a constructive
trust on the proceeds of the policy to help support the child. In McDonald v. McDonald,
57 Or. App. 6, 643 P.2d 1280 (1982), the court did not impose a constructive trust under
similar circumstances. The court distinguished Sinsel, which involved one easily traceable
policy, from McDonald, which involved five policies, none of which was designated to sup-
port the children. The distinction may be spurious; the court in McDonald may tacitly be
considering the children's failure to visit their father. Id. at 1282 n.6.
152. See Morris v. Henry, 193 Va. 631, 70 S.E.2d 417 (1952), in which the court
describes the majority and minority views concerning enforcement of court-ordered sup-
port decrees against an estate.
153. Id. at 641, 70 S.E.2d at 423 (emphasis added).
154. Reform proposals to assist disinherited children have also come before the New
York legislature. See infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text. Outside the specific line
of cases discussed, but indicative of the priority New York gives child support, is In re
Estate of Chusid, 60 Misc. 462, 301 N.Y.S.2d 766 (Sur. Ct. 1969). The dependent children
were income beneficiaries of a trust that their grandfather established for his son and
grandchildren. The father did not provide sufficient support for the children. The court, in
a decision of first impression, ordered the trustees to exercise their discretion and to invade
the principal of the trust for the children. A surrogate is a probate judge in New York
State. See N.Y. SuRR. CT. PROc. AcT § 2603(1) (McKinney 1967).
155. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.3 (McKinney 1981), repealed by 1981
N.Y. Laws, ch. 461 (July 7, 1981), provided:
(a) A person may make a testamentary disposition of his entire estate to any
person for a benevolent, charitable, educational, literary, scientific, religious
or missionary purpose, provided that if any such disposition is contested by
the testator's surviving issue or parents, it shall be valid only to the extent of
one-half of such testator's estate, wherever situated, after the payment of
debts, subject to the following:
(1) An issue or parent may not contest a disposition as invalid unless he will
receive a pecuniary benefit from a successful contest as a beneficiary
under the will or as a distributee.
For the reasons for the repeal, see infra note 172.
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receive some pecuniary benefit from a successful challenge of the testa-
mentary disposition. In an effort to manipulate the statute to achieve
"fair" results, the New York surrogates construed the law for the ben-
efit of disinherited children even when the "pecuniary benefit" require-
ment was not satisfied.
In In re Estate of Norcross,156 for example, the surrogate permit-
ted the decedent's daughter, who was excluded from decedent's will,
to challenge a charitable disposition. The court relied primarily on the
absence of an express intent to disinherit the daughter 57 and found
potential pecuniary benefit, and therefore a basis for the challenge, in
the intestate distribution that she would receive if the court were to set
aside the charitable disposition. The fact that the testator excluded his
daughter from receiving any benefit from his will did not bar her from
bringing the action.158
The surrogate in In re Estate of Rothko, 15 9 following Norcross,
permitted the children of the testator to challenge the testamentary
disposition despite the fact that they probably would not receive pecu-
niary benefit.160 Surrogate Midonick, a supporter of family mainte-
nance reform in New York, observed that under New York law "issue
can be disinherited unquestionably, even though they be the testator's
defenseless babies in the cradle in favor of any human being whether
related to the testator or totally unrelated." 16' Noting the discrepancy
between the enforceability of parental support obligations while a par-
ent is alive and the lapse of those obligations upon the parent's
death,' 62 Surrogate Midonick advocates remedial family maintenance
156. 67 Misc. 2d 932, 325 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sur. Ct. 1971), aft'd, 39 A.D.2d 874, 334
N.Y.S.2d 600 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972).
157. The will stated that the testator did not lack affection for his daughter but left her
no portion of the estate because inter vivos gifts had provided for her support. 67 Misc. 2d
at 937, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
158. The court distinguished an earlier case of this type, In re Estate of Cairo, 35
A.D.2d 76, 312 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1970), aff'd 29 N.Y.2d 527, 272 N.E.2d 574, 324 N.Y.S.2d
81 (1971), in which the testator expressly disinherited thepetitioner. 67 Misc. 2d at 937-38,
325 N.Y.S.2d at 482. The disinheritance was found to express the intent of the testator,
and barred a challenge under N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.3. Moreover, § 1-
2.18 has been interpreted to make a disinheritance in a will effective to preclude that person
from taking under intestate distribution. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 1-2.18,
Practice Commentary, at 42 (McKinney 1981). The Norcross court used this express disin-
heritance to distinguish the cases. See 67 Misc. 2d at 937-38, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
159. 71 Misc. 2d 74, 35 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sur. Ct. 1972).
160. The children of Mark Rothko were to be beneficiaries under his will only in the
event that the primary beneficiary, their mother, died. The lack of express intent to disin-
herit was the pivotal issue in this case as well as in Norcross. See Rothko, 71 Misc. 2d at 76,
335 N.Y.S.2d at 668; Norcross, 67 Misc. 2d at 937-38, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
161. Rothko, 71 Misc. 2d at 77, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 670.
162. However, under present New York laws a parent can utterly disinherit his
minor children (and leave the burden of their support to equally defenseless tax-
payers) from the moment of death. If such an unconscionable financial abandon-
ment of young children is forbidden by the family laws and by the criminal laws
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legislation to impose parental support obligations upon a deceased
parent's estate. 163 A child should not be forced to rely upon the inge-
nuity of a court to receive parental support.
In re Estate of Willey'" expanded Rothko and Norcross by elimi-
nating the distinction between express and implied disinheritance.
The surrogate noted that every will bequeathing an estate to charity
necessarily disinherits issue. In a subtle shift of focus, however, this
court emphasized the right of a relative to elect against a disposition
rather than the intent of the testator: "[T]he right of issue to elect...
is a limitation on the right of the testator to dispose of his property
and is a personal right conferred by the legislature which cannot be
diminished or abrogated by judicial construction." 165 Thus, Willey
abandoned the distinction between express and implied disinheritance
that earlier courts had used in order to find possible pecuniary benefit,
thereby making the statute applicable to any disinherited dependent.
Subsequently, the New York Court of Appeals halted the increas-
ingly liberal interpretations of the statute. In In re Estate of Eckart,166
the court ruled that children who are disinherited or receive a nominal
bequest tantamount to disinheritance may not challenge a charitable
distribution. 167 Judge Wachtler observed that the structure of the stat-
ute defeats the statute's intended purpose of preventing "improvident
and unjust wills, which deprive the relatives and dependents of the
testator of proper consideration in the distribution of his estate."1 68 A
testator can circumvent the requirements of the statute by providing
an alternate disposition to a third party in the event that the charitable
disposition fails. Such an alternate disposition would prevent the chal-
lenging person from receiving any pecuniary benefit; thus, it would
preclude that person from recovering under the statute for lack of the
requisite pecuniary interest. After Eckart, courts condoned alterna-
tive dispositions that would prevent the issue or spouse from deriving
while a parent is alive, why should death of a wealthy parent free him or her to
make a young minor child destitute?
Id. at 78, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 670.
163. See supra note 5.
164. 85 Misc. 2d 380, 380 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sur. Ct. 1976). The facts of Willey are similar
to those in Norcross: the testatrix expressly disinherited her children because she had pro-
vided for them adequately with inter vivos gifts.
165. 85 Misc. 2d at 384, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
166. 39 N.Y.2d 493, 348 N.E.2d 905, 384 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1976). The facts of Eckart are
similar to the others in this line of cases. The testatrix gave her two children nominal
bequests, which were tantamount to disinheritance, and gave the remainder of her estate to
a charity.
167. The court revived the Cairo holding, which Norcross, Rothko, and Willey had
eroded. See 39 N.Y.2d at 502, 348 N.E.2d at 910, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 434. See supra notes
158-64.
168. Eckart, 39 N.Y.2d at 500, 348 N.E.2d at 909, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 433 (quoting Hollis
v. Drew Theol. Seminary, 95 N.Y. 166, 174-75 (1884)).
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a pecuniary benefit from a successful challenge. Consequently, a
spouse or issue could not challenge wills that contained an alternate
disposition if the charitable grant failed. Judicial interpretation could
not remedy a problem that the language of the statute created so
explicitly. 69 Thus, Judge Wachtler shifted the onus back to the legis-
lature to conform the law to its objective. 170
Although Eckart made the surrogates' task clearer, the decision
constricted the powers of a court to provide equitable assistance to
disinherited dependents. Moreover, if the purpose of the statute was
to help disinherited dependents confronted with excessive charitable
dispositions, the case provided drafters with a way of circumventing
that purpose by drafting in the alternative. Observing this problem,
which Eckart accentuated, subsequent courts called for legislation to
provide disinherited dependents with a remedy. 171 The legislature
responded by repealing the troublesome statute,172 but it did not
replace it with a more carefully drafted or more comprehensive cure.
These cases illustrate that many state courts have devised ad hoc
doctrines to provide for dependent children. This judicial initiative
has created restrictions on freedom of testation and permitted courts
to enforce family support obligations. Unfortunately, these practices
are subject to abatement at any time by higher court decisions, as the
New York cases illustrate. 73 Decisive legislation that acknowledges
parental support obligations and authorizes limitations on testamen-
169. Writing of the stare decisis effect of the Cairo opinion, that disinherited relatives
could not challenge a charitable disposition, Judge Wachtler observed:
True, Cairo permits a testator to easily avoid the statute by expressly disinheriting
those who might otherwise challenge the will. But the statute itself permits the
same result if the testator simply creates a gift over to one not qualified to contest.
In other words it is the statute itself and not the Cairo opinion which disrupts the
stated legislative purpose.
Eckart, 39 N.Y.2d at 502, 348 N.E.2d at 910, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
170. Id.
171. Id. Surrogate Midonick commented on the unsatisfactory situation in In re Estate
of Alexander, 90 Misc. 2d 482, 395 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sur. Ct. 1977), which concerned a chari-
table disposition, but was dismissed in accordance with an unreported Court of Appeals
decision. The dismissal in Alexander is not disturbing, because the election was made by an
adult son, not a dependent minor. Surrogate Midonick observed that the decision might
have been disturbing if the suit had been brought by a minor. Compare Alexander, 90
Misc. 2d 482, 395 N.Y.S.2d 598 (no award to adult son), with Coventry, [1979] 3 W.L.R.
802 (award to independent adult son). See supra text accompanying notes 124-27. But an
English court would probably not have granted provision to the applicant in Alexander.
172. The statute was repealed by 1981 N.Y. Laws, ch. 461 (July 7, 1981). The reasons
given for its repeal were that the statute created too much litigation and confusion and that
it could be circumvented easily. See [1981] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 254-55 (Memorandum of
Assem. Hannon).
173. For example, an appellate court may change the burden of proof in pretermission
statutes so that they no longer favor children or require more explicit jury instructions in
order to reduce the significance of jury sympathy.
350 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
tary freedom could remedy the uncertainty that the judiciary's ad hoe
approach created.
IV
PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Parental support obligations and freedom of testation are impor-
tant yet often conflicting policies. State statutes currently subordinate
parental support obligations to freedom of testation and do not pro-
vide the flexibility characteristic of a balancing approach. Complete
deference to testamentary freedom produces unsatisfying results.
There is no absolute freedom of testation. It is restricted in many
ways, for example, by statutory shares, limits on charitable disposi-
tions, the rule against perpetuities, taxes, and testamentary formalities.
In addition, creditors may restrict dispositions by satisfying obliga-
tions from the debtor's estate. 174 Finally, court-created doctrines
establish many common law limitations on testamentary freedom. 75
The privileged position of testamentary freedom vis-A-vis parental sup-
port obligations is difficult to explain, because the policies behind cur-
rent restrictions are not significantly more important than the
obligation of a parent to a dependent child.
Courts are sympathetic to the problems of disinherited depen-
dents. They recognize the need for balancing the two policies equita-
bly, perhaps because they are confronted most frequently with
hardship situations. Courts, however, are not bound to consider both
policies as an integral part of every decision. Moreover, there are no
clearly established criteria to which courts can refer consistently in
order to balance between the two policies. The language of current
statutes strictly limits the factors that a court may consider in a partic-
ular case.176 The result of this amorphous state of the law is a funda-
mental uncertainty concerning the rights of a disinherited child and
the role of courts in remedying hardship situations.
Legislative reform can alleviate both the rigidity of statutory
prohibitions and the inconsistent judicial revision of testamentary
plans. There are two basic categories of legislative reform: (1) fixed
legitime shares and (2) family maintenance. 77 Some theorists blend
the two solutions by proposing that dependents receive a compulsory
share that would vary according to their needs.' 78 Many proposals
would include certain inter vivos transfers in the basic estate from
174. Haskell, supra note 62, at 508-09.
175. See supra notes 135-53 and accompanying text.
176. See, eg., N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRUSTs LAW § 5-3.3. See supra note 155.
177. See, e.g., W. MACDONALD, supra note 58, at 299-301; Laufer, supra note 56, at
312-14.
178. See Haskell, supra note 62, at 518-21; Cahn, supra note 8, at 146-48.
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which the support payment will be taken. 179 The proposals also differ
on the requisite duration of the support. Some commentators would
terminate support at the age of eighteen or twenty-one, while others
would extend support until the child has completed his education or is
self-supporting. 80
New York first recognized the inconsistencies and inadequacies of
its laws in a series of official reports composed during the 1930s.181 In
the mid-1960s, the New York Temporary State Commission on the
Law of Estates analyzed the inequities of the system and proposed
family maintenance reform. The Commission observed that the sys-
tem "reflects an indifference to moral and social responsibility."'' 8 2
The Commission proposed that support be extended to dependent
children and that this support terminate when the dependent reaches
the age of twenty-one. 183 The Commission's recommendations were
not enacted, but reformists have been active in New York since that
time.'84
A more recent New York proposal would permit children to
enforce a preexisting parental support decree against the deceased's
estate. 8 5 Payments would come from a trust fund formed from the
decedent's estate for the benefit of his children and administered by
the court. The trust would terminate when the child reaches twenty-
one years of age, and the dependent child would then receive the resi-
due of the corpus. Critics originally said that the bill was too vague
and was overly generous to dependent children. 86 The legislature has
not yet adopted the bill, but in 1979 it won the approval of two major
bar associations.' 87
179. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
180. See FOURTH REPORT, supra note 114, at 1493 (support terminated no later than
upon reaching age 21).
181. See STATE OF NEW YORK, COMBINED REPORTS OF THE COMMISSION To INVES-
TIGATE DEFECTS IN THE LAWS OF ESTATES FOR THE YEARS 1928-1929-1930-1931-1932
AND 1933, REPORTS TO THE LEGISLATURE (1933).
182. FOURTH REPORT, supra note 114, at 1343.
183. Id. at 1492-93. The Commission proposed that a court examining an application
for support consider the following guidelines: earning potential of the child, the decedent's
reasons for making the original disposition, and the conduct of the child towards the dece-
dent. Id. at 1493.
184. See, eg., COMM. ON STATE LEGISLATION OF THE N.Y. COUNTY LAWYERS'
ASS'N, INDEX OF REPORT ON NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE BILLS, REP. No. 70
(1977); COMM. ON STATE LEGISLATION ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
BULL. No. 3, COMM. ON TRUSTS, ESTATES AND SURROGATES' COURTS, No. 43 (May 5,
1975).
185. See Foster, Freed & Midonick, supra note 5, at i191-94 app.
186. COMM. ON STATE LEGISLATION OF THE N.Y. COUNTY LAWYERS' ASS'N, INDEX
OF REPORTS ON NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE BILLS, REP. No. 70 (1977).
187. NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYER'S ASS'N, REP. No. 138 (1979). N.Y. Assem. 4113,
10702, 205th Sess. (1982); N.Y. Sen. 3160, 8541, 205th Sess. (1982).
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The New York proposal does not go far enough in assisting disin-
herited dependents. The latest bill would merely convert New York
from the minority view concerning enforcement of support decrees
against an estate to the majority view.18 8 A more comprehensive solu-
tion is necessary to provide support for children who do not have a
support decree to enforce. 189 A child's right to support does not
depend upon a support decree when the parent is alive. Consequently,
a child's right to enforce a support obligation against an estate should
not hinge upon a preexisting decree after the parent dies.
The adoption of a system providing legitime shares, like Louisi-
ana's system, 190 would not satisfy a dependent's support needs as well
as a family maintenance system. Forced shares provide a guaranteed
level of support, but the legitime system does not consider the size of
the estate or whether the share is adequate for the needs of the individ-
ual. What constitutes an adequate level of support varies according to
the facts of the case; therefore, the statute should not set the amount
arbitrarily. Finally, the legitime system is unnecessarily restrictive of
testamentary freedom, because forced heirship requirements cannot be
waived, even if the disinherited party is not dependent.
Family maintenance legislation mitigates the tension between
freedom of testation and support obligations by balancing the two pol-
icies properly. Freedom of testation is subordinated only when it is
necessary to enforce parental obligations. Family maintenance is less
offensive to testamentary freedom than is forced heirship, which
always infringes on testamentary freedom. Under the family mainte-
nance system, even a testamentary disposition that is prima facie
unfair in light of criteria other than support obligations will be upheld
if it satisfies the basic support obligation set by the court.
Developments in contemporary family structure accentuate the
need for reform. The rise in the number of divorces and the concomi-
tant rise in the number of testators leaving multiple families19' create
support problems that a family maintenance scheme would alleviate.
A testator who leaves more than one family may have more obliga-
tions than his estate can satisfy. A statutory share system distributes
support arbitrarily, according to the legal relationship between the
decedent and each dependent, regardless of need. Such a system oper-
ates fairly when the estate is ample, but when a decedent's testamen-
tary plan disinherits a needy party yet provides for a self-sufficient
party merely because of legal dependency, the need for equitable
188. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
189. See Foster, Freed & Midonick, supra note 5, at 1189.
190. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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reform becomes clear. Additionally, the children of divorced parents
are at a disadvantage in relation to the children of a second marriage
and are likely to depend upon a stepparent's benevolence. The best
solution to these problems is a flexible court procedure that considers
both need and dependency in each case.192
The American critics of family maintenance legislation repeat
many of the same arguments and doubts that members of the British
Parliament articulated in the 1930s. 193 Critics claim that the flexibility
of the proposed reform would become a basis for unwarranted litiga-
tion. 194 They also refer to the imprudence of providing courts with a
mechanism for rearranging testamentary dispositions. 195
Proponents of reform refer to the proven success of the English
law. 196 Litigation need not increase, because testators would be on
notice that the statute permits challenges. Thus, they may be less
inclined to make inadequate provisions that would provoke judicial
interference with their testamentary scheme. Consequently, litigation
may actually decrease.197 Moreover, a well-drafted statute with pre-
cise guidelines should restrain judicial discretion to an appropriate
level.' 98
Estate planners warn that the flexibility provided by family main-
tenance legislation will remove the certainty of disposition, which is
essential to the effective treatment of tax issues. 199 Again, the advo-
cates of reform maintain that family maintenance will not rupture the
192. The inadequacies of the Oregon statute may be attributed to a failure to treat the
multiple family situation explicitly. The statute is ineffective, because it provides no gui-
dance for courts in this situation, when guidance is needed most. See supra notes 78-82 and
accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
194. See THIRD REPORT, supra note 104, at 211.
195. See id. at 211.
196. The English family maintenance system is successful in that it recognizes the prob-
lem created by the tension between the two policies. Moreover, it provides a means by
which judges can work through the problem on a case-by-case basis and develop solutions
in accordance with the legislative policy.
197. However, the United States is a more litigious country than England. Two factors
may affect probate proceedings directly: (1) estates in the United States are typically larger,
making the incentive to litigate greater; and (2) in England, an unsuccessful plaintiff must
bear the entire cost of the litigation. See Jolis v. Jolis, 111 Misc. 2d 965, 446 N.Y.S.2d 138
(Sup. Ct. 1981).
198. A prime example of such a statute is the Marital Equitable Distribution Law, N.Y.
DoM. REL. LAW § 236(5), pt. B, (McKinney 1983 Supp.) The statute provides specific
guidelines for division of property upon dissolution of a marriage. In Jolis v. Jolis, I ll
Misc. 2d at 988-89, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 151-52, for example, the court's application of the
statute resulted in an opinion that rivals Malone v. Harrison, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1353, in its
precision. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. The opinion illustrates that
courts can achieve good results with carefully drafted statutes. State legislatures consider-
ing reform should examine precisely drafted divorce statutes as a model for family mainte-
nance proposals.
199. See THIRD REPORT, supra note 104, at 211.
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predictability that is central to estate planning, because the estate plan-
ner will know of the statute and will be able to draft instruments that
accommodate the testator's support obligations. 2°° Furthermore,
American family maintenance legislation can copy the English method
of taxing the original disposition scheme rather than the one the court
has revised.20 1
The effectiveness of the system in England has proven the criti-
cism of family maintenance reform inaccurate.20 2 Current legislative
inaction must be the result of simple inertia.203 American jurisdictions
should learn from the English experience and should stop sacrificing
support obligations for freedom of testation. The English system suc-
cessfully accommodates both policies and has proven responsive and
adaptable to society's changing views of support obligations. 2°4
This use of comparative legal method will delineate the bounda-
ries of prudent legislative action. The precise contours of the law, of
course, will vary to some degree from state to state with the particular
societal norms concerning a dependent's entitlement to support. A
review of the English legislative history and the current law should be
the first step in the movement for legislative reform in the United
States. State legislatures should also compare the needs of English
society with those of American society in order to ensure that any
remedial action is appropriate and is sufficiently flexible to respond to
future changes.
Reform legislation should be based on a study of family structure
and resulting parental support obligations in the United States. It may
become evident, for example, that reliance on the surviving spouse to
support the child is no longer prudent in light of divorce statistics.
Study may also reveal that educational expenses and life insurance
policies, which in some instances are obligations of living parents,
should be imposed on a deceased parent's estate. A legislature consid-
ering reform must know what support obligations it intends to
200. See Laufer, supra note 56, at 313-14.
201. The 1975 Act, at § 58(3).
202. The English family maintenance system provides for effective and precise resolu-
tion of support disputes. This is best illustrated by the extremely lucid opinions reached
under the statute. See Malone, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1353, for an example of a precise analysis
and payment computation made under a family maintenance statute. See supra notes 120-
23 and accompanying text.
203. See Haskell, supra note 62, at 501. "It seems obvious that this drastic interference
with the freedom of testamentary disposition should not be sanctioned until it has received
wide and complete attention . . . ." COMM. ON STATE LEGISLATION OF THE N.Y.
CouNTY LAWYERS' ASS'N, INDEX OF REPORTS ON NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE BILLS,
REP. No. 236 (1975).
204. Examples of changing social forces are the change in the family structure caused by
the rising number of divorces, changing roles of the sexes, and the growing perception of
the need to provide special education for children with high capabilities or specialized
goals.
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enforce.205
Complete subordination of support obligations to freedom of tes-
tation is no longer justifiable. Current law forces judges who recognize
support obligations to improvise the means to obtain equitable results.
A dependent's right to support should not depend upon a particular
court's imagination. The goal of reform should be legislation that
establishes the importance of support obligations and limits judicial
discretion by specific guidelines. Moreover, the law, like current fam-
ly law, should be reviewed periodically to respond to changing social
and moral values. American legislatures should enact statutes pat-
terned after the 1975 Act, which balances support obligations and tes-
tamentary freedom.
CONCLUSION
In the United States, the tension between freedom of testation and
parental support obligations is currently resolved by dismissing sup-
port obligations in favor of testamentary freedom. This resolution of
the conflict is hardly justifiable in light of the harsh results and the
uncertainty that the current law engenders. Neither courts nor depen-
dents should be forced to rely upon indirect methods to balance sup-
port obligations and freedom of testation. Family maintenance
legislation patterned after the English family maintenance system
would establish a mechanism for balancing the two policies and for
achieving equitable results in a rational fashion. Jurisdictions in the
United States should adopt family maintenance legislation
immediately.
Elizabeth Travis High *
205. Societal changes give rise to obligations that family maintenance might consider.
One example of these changes is the obligation owed to partners in unmarried relationships.
See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 831
(1976).
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